Introduction

Overview
This is a study of the theoretical capabilities and limitations of machines or algorithmic devices which perform inductive inference. Our approach is recursion theoretic [34] and essentially originates with E.M. Gold [21] and L. and M. Bium [7] . From the point of view of artificial intelligence our theorems are about the theoretical limits of robots as scientists, and at least from suitably formulated positivistic and mechanistic philosophical stances they are about the limits of science itself. For an interesting commentary on modern mechanism see [37] .
We define many new criteria of success based on the size of sets of anomalies in the programs synthesized by inductive inference machines and compare the degree to which such machines, employed with these and other criteria in the literature [2-4, 6, 13, 27, 30] , approach being completely general purpose. The major results (2.3, 2.6, 2.7, 3.1, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.10) prove the existence of a natural w +o + 1 hierarchy of criteria based on anomalies and ending in a criterion for which some machines are completely general purpose. Various of these results and 2.18 are interpreted as tradeoff results, as about the inherent relative speed of processes, or as heretofore unnoticed weaknesses in Popper's refutability principle [3 11.
Many of the results in this paper were announced in [ 141.
The reader generally interested in the machine inference literature may wish to ccxxult [I] which surveys both the abstract (recursion theoretic) and the more concrete approaches. The very interesting survq 1241 of East German litcraturc on inference has recently come to our attention. naax (8) = 0. The quantifier (I/"%) is read "for all but finitely many x", and (3"~) is read '*there e-ists infinitely many x such that". P holds a.e. means (Y"x)[P(x)] holds. Lower case Greek letters near the end of the alphabet,. . . , CT, r, . . . , range over finite sequences of natural numbers, i.e., functions from finite initial segments of N into N. We sometimes speak of u as an initial segment. [nz/nj denotes the greatest integer <(m/n), and [m/rrl, the least integer a(m/n).
Explanatory inductive inference
Esphcltiorls with artontalics
Suppose a real world phenomenon F is being investigated scientifically by an agent M. A4 performs discmt~ experiments x on F and receives back corresponding discrete experimental results /(xl. x and f(x 1 are discrete since we never actually IIIMSU~~ a continuum of possibilities. We take f to be single-valued because in science one deals only with replicable, deterministic outcomes; for example, in quantum mechanics tht replicable, deterministic outcome is sometimes a probability distribution or a fringe pattern -not the position and mcmentum of individual particles.
By sutable GGdel numbering we may treat the f associated with F as a function from N, the set of natural numbers, into N. L. and M. Blum [7] consider the case where f is a pmi~~l function from NJ into N. Most of our ensuing discussion could be carried out mrtutis rnrttmdis for partial functions. However, since total functions suttice to obtain our major theorems, we simplify our exposition by supposing all phenomena F define associated total functions j.
Definition 2.1. A (complete and predictive) explatzntiorz of F is just a computer program for computing j1
Such a program for computing f gives us predictive power about the results of all possible experiments on F. Naturally only those F for which the associated f' is computable have an explanation in this sense.
WC consider the case where the agent A4 is a machine.
Definition 2.2 (Gold [2 111. An itzductice itlferetwe machine (abbreviatedJIM)
is an slgorithmlc device with no N priori bounds on how much time or memory resource it shall use, which takes as its input the graph of a function from %J into N an ordered pair at a time (in any order ), and which from time to time, as it's receiving its input, outputs computer programs.
We next introduce our first notion of what it means for an IIM to SUCCUCY~ at eventually finding an explanation for a function or phenomenon.
This notion is essentially from [21] , but see also [7] . Definition 2.3. M EX-identifies a function f (written: f~ EX(M)) iff M, when fed the graph off in any order, outputs over time only finitely many computer programs the last of which computes (or explains) f.
No restriction is made in Definition 2.3 that we should be able to algorithmically determine when (if ever) 1M on f has output its last computer program. That this r~oufd be a restriction follows from Corollary 2.18 below.
Definition 2.4. An IIM n/r is said to be order independent iff for any function f, the corresponding sequence of programs ocltput by A& is independent of the order in which f is input.
Clearly, any IIM M can be effectively transformed into an IIM AN' which preprocesses any input f and feeds it to A! in the order (O&O)), (1, f(l)), (2,f (2) '4n order independence result that covers the case of partial functions appears in 173 .
In what follows we shall suppose without loss of generality that all IIM's are order independent. EX is the collection of all sets 9 of rtxulsi~c functions such that some IiM EX-identifies every function in Y. We have for example We now motivate our next theorem. Newton [29] Newton himself was aware of a difficulty with the explanation of light; namely, that light was required to have an ostensibly contradictory dual, wave and particle nature. We know from hindsight that Newtonian physics and its classical extensions have some serious flaws or anomalies. For example, the classical explanation of dispersion is anomalous in the X-ray region. The quantum mechanical explanation of dispersion also covers the X-ray case, but the point is that physicists sometimes actually employ an explanation which has an anomaly in it, an explanation wli,ch fails to correctly predict the outcome of, say, one experiment but which is correct on all other experiments. 
Gold [Z l]
showed that rhere is no general purpose !IM in the sense that no single inductive inference machine can EX-identify every recursive function. Our next theorem implies that if the goal set of IIM's is relaxed to allow a possible single anomaly in e?lylanations, then, in general, they can identify strictly larger classes of recursive functions than those that are error intolerant.
Theorem 2.3. Lt~!f = {fiq5,,,~, ='f). 771~ 9% (EX'-EX).
There are two possible kinds of single anomalies in an explanatory program. The first kind occurs when the program on some one input actually gives an output which is incorrect. Anomalous dispersion is essentially an example of this type. This kind of single anomaly eventually can be found out, reflrfed, and patched. The second kind occurs when the program on some one input fails to give any output at all; the explanation is irrcornplete. For example [25, p. 291, Newtonian celestial mechanics fails to make any prediction at all as to the direcrion of planetary motion about the sun. Because of the unsolvability of the halting problem this latter kind of anomaly, irt geru~ml, cannot be algorithmically found out; the explanation is not, in general, (algorithmically) refutable. If we define EX='-identification just as we defined EX'-identification but we replace "except perhaps at one anomalous input" by "except at exnctlp one anomalous input", we have that EX' ' = EX. This is because exactly one anomaly (of either kind) can be patched in the: limit: patch in the correct output for input 0 until (if ever) it is discovered that the output was already correct on input 0, then patch in the correct output for input 1 until . . . . Eventually the patch will come to rest on the single anomaly which needed patching. It follows that the strength of EX'-identification must come from two sources: possibly incomplete explanations and our inability to test algorithmically for incompleteness. Our proof below of Theorem 2.3 reflects this last observation.
Apparently Popper [31] and perhaps philosophers of science, in general, have not sufficiently taken into account the possibility of irrefutable, incomplete explanations. EX'-identification is certainly a "practical" identification criterion in the sense that for most purposes the possibility of only one mistaken or missing prediction is tolerable. That it is stronger than EX-identification constitutes a repudiation of the principle that all incorrect scientific explanations ought to he refutable. Theorem 2.3 implies that the application of this principle imposes an otherwise surpassable limit on the ability of IIM's to identify large classes of phenomena. In fact, Theorem 2.3 actually repudiates a weak form of the principle of refutability, a form which demands only that one's final explanation be subjrct to refutation. Naturally an improved refutability principle which takes into account incomplete explanations can be formulated: a purported explanation of a given phenomenon should be subject to refutation at least on those predictions it actually makes but which are incorrect, but not necessarily on those it should have made but failed to make at all.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let MO be an inductive inference machine which, when fed f outputs program f(O) as its only conjecture. Clearly, A& witnesses that YE EX'. It suffices, then, to show that each machine A! fails to identify some f in 9. Let A$ be given. We exhibit below a program c which computes a (partial) function the Nero extension of which will be the desired ,C Program c implicitly uses thtz Kleenc recursion thtmrem 134, p. 2141 that is, ~8 ust's as a datum a (quiescent) copy of , itstJf that i: obtains cithor by self-replication or by "looking in ;i mirror". EX as witnessed by& from the proof of Theorem also witnesses that P', E E-Y='. By the remarks following the statement of Theorem 2.3,Yl E: EX. (You 14p1) = (~Ic$~,~~, :='/.j, which by Theorem 2.3 is not an element of EX. Cl
In [36] the non-union theorem is generalized in several ways. [27) and [39] contain results about special cases for which the non-union theorem fails.
In Theorem 2.3 we were concerned with strengthening explanatory identification by allowing the possibility of a single anomaly. What if we allow more anomalies? Definition 2.7. (a) iVi EX'*-idelztifies f (written: ,'@ EX"(A4)) iff M, when fed the graph of f in any order, outputs a last program which computes f except perhaps on at most rz anomalous inputs.
(
We have the following strengthening of Theorem 2.3. Proof. Clearly ,Y: E EX*. Suppose by way of contradiction that !#' E U,,t k EX". Then !3t I[.% EX"]. Hence, any subset of ,!f is also in EX". But {fl&,~, = "' 'f} is a subset of ,Cf which is not in FX", ii contradiction.
El
As an immediate consequence of either Theorem 2.3, Theorem 2.6, or Corollary 2.7, we have the following. 
Identification criteria for machine inductive inference '01
Combining the results of this section we have that EX = EX"': EX' c . l cEX"cEX"+'c~~~cEX*.
Some apparent variations on the theme of EX"-identification
Suppose a E N* = N u {*). For a machine to EX"-identify a function j we required it to output a last program p such that &, = "f. In this section we ex;tmine some variations on EX"-identification. A!' on input f runs A4 on f. Let po, . . . , pk be the distinct programs rM has output on f t ttl. First M' cattcels any program p,, i s k, such that for more than rz values .\: s 01, &,(.v ) converges in srn steps #f lx ). For each uncancelled pI, let xl, . . . , XI, Is tI be the arguments x 6 tn (if any) 0~ which pi converges in <rn steps #f(x L Program q, is just program pi patched to be correct on x 1, . . . . , xl. Let p be the program described as follows. p on any input y simulates, also on input y, each of the ;rngrams qi corresponding to uncutwelled programs pi, p outputs t%e same values as the (lexicographically least) qi which converges first. If p is not the ksf program output by 1M' so far, 1M' outputs p.
Suppose now f E OEX"(M)
. Then at least one of the finitely many programs pi output infinitely often by 1M on f is such that q&,, ="fi Let m() be so large that (i) if pi is any one of the finitely many distinct programs ever output by A# or, f, then pi has been output at least once by M on f# mo, Informally an enunzeratior? operator [34] 8 is just a mapping from the subsets of N into the subsets of N such that there is an algorithmic device which, when fed any enumeration of a set A EN, outputs an enumeration of the set 6(A). Let us identify any function f with {(A-, f(x)) 1.x E N} E N. We have the following
Corollary 2.1 I. Suppose 11 E N. 7'ilcrz 9% IX" iff there is at1 cnwrtcrcUior~ opcrcltc?r f3 such thtrt (VfE 97[f?(f) is a jhite set and (3,v E F)(f))[qS,, ="f]].
Theorem 2.12. FEX" = EX*.
Proof. We show how to effectively transform any IIM AZ into a corresponding IIM M' such that FEX*(Af) E EX*(AY'). M' on f runs i%Z on f. Suppose nl has seen so far f 4 m. Let po, p,, . . . , pk be the finitely many distinct programs M has output so far. First M' cam*& any pi, i s k, such that the number of values s s 1~1, for which d,,, !_x ) converges in <IPI steps #j'(s) C~UC& the number of times AI has output pI so far. Let [I be as follows. (1 on any input y simulates, also on input y. each of the rtrtcurtct~lit~~t programs pi. 11 outputs the same value as the (lexicographicaIly least) pI which converges first. If !) is not the last program output by M' so far, 121' outputs p.
Suppose now f E FEX"'(M). Then each of the finitely many p, output intinitel> often by M on f is such that c#+,, =*,j'. Let m,, tw so large that (i) any of the finitely many ditfcrent programs p, output by .\I on y' has been output at least once by 111 on f'$ IZZ~),
(iii any such p, with infinitely many convergent mistakes has been discovered in --ml steps to have more convergent mistakes than the total, finite number of times it is output by A4 on j', and (iii) any p, output infinitely often is not cancelled any time after A4 sees fk mo. Clearly after 1M' has seen f # m o, any more input does not lead to new cancellations. Hence, IM' on f outputs a last program p. Furthermore, this p sim4ates a Spite collection of progl_..xs pi none of which makes more than finitely many mistakes of convergence and at least one of which makes no more than finitely many mistakes of any kind. Hence, & =*j'. q The construction in the previous proof is based on L. and M. Blum's proof of the Non-Union Theorem for EX-identification (Corollary 2.5 above) [7] and yields 3s a corollary (as did the proof in 173) a Non-Union Theorem for EX*-identification.
Boroidittg rite twttlber of ttlitid changes utiroirtc to convergence
In the proofs of Theorems 2.3 and 2.6, the machine witnessing that the appropriate 9' is in EX" ' I identifies correctly with its first and only conjecture. This machine never changes its mind. [5] independently and previously considered mind change complexity. Theorem 2.6 can now be restated as follows. The rcadcr may find it uset'ul to consult Fig. 1 at the end of Section 3.2 which is a graphical display of (among other things) the comparisons between the EXz's.
It Clearly we have that NV c NV' z NV". The relations of NV"-extrapolation to the other kinds of extrapolation and to identification by IIM's will be taken up in Section 3.1. Among other things it will be shown that EX* c NV". In this section we will determine the relation of NV and NV'-extrapolation to various kinds of identificatiow by IIM's including all those kinds studied in the previous sections.
Proof of Corollary 2.18. (G=) is
In the discussion following Theorem 2.3 ((EX' -EX) # 8) we observed that application of Popper's refutability principle to final explanations output by IIM's limits the ability of IIM's to identify large classes of phenomena. A strict adherence to Popper's principle would presumably demand that all of the explanations output by an IIM be everywhere subject to refutation. It follows immediate11 that NV z EX; furthermore, it will be shown below that NV's EX, (NV'-NV) f (3, and (EX -NV') f 49. [4] ). NV = {Spl 97s contained in some r.e. class L. and M. Blum [ 7] show that REX-identification is characterized by EXidentification restricted to an interesting class of reliable machines. Some of these machines can REX-identify arbitrarily a.e. complex O-l valued recursive f:qqctions. Each uf these machines, when it converges on a function f, converges to a pr:*bgram of "size" [!?I no greater than that of a program for f having minimal size among those whose run time is optimal modulo some total effective operator [34] . Such programs, therefore, satisfy an approximate but precise form of Occam's Razor. Minicozzi [27] observes that REX unlike EX is closed under finite union, and, more generally, r.e. union.
The class NV (hence also PEX) can be characterized in several ways. We state without proof the following complexity class [26] characterization obtained by Barzdin and Freivald and independently by Len Adleman.
Theorem 2.20 [4,7]. NV = {YI (3 recursive t)(Vf E 3')(3i)[& = f and @i d t a.e.1).
Theorem 2.21 (Barzdin and Freivald
Gf recursive functions).
Proof. (E). Suppose 3' E NV. Then there is a Popperian machine kf such that 9' G PEX(M). Let 9' = (4,, ((3a)[M(o) = p]}. Clearly Y is
We proceed to compare REX with NV, NV', and the EXg's. +(3j)[@i c @j and @j is total] ]. Let .Y = {@i 1 @i is total and i E N}. We show that 9' E (REX-NV').
Suppose by way of contradiction that M is an EM such that Y s NV'(.&,. Then, by property P above, if @i is an initial segment Gth x0 = the least num-
. . . , @i(xo-1)) converges. By implicit use of the recursion theorem in tdi)icN, we obtain a program e such that e on any input x first computes y =A(@JO), . . . , 4& (.x -1) Proof. This is immediate from Theorems 2.34 and 2.33. 7
This completes the comparisons of NV, NV', REX and the EXz's.
Behaviorally correct inductive inference
I. ReCatiorr to explanatory indrrctitlc irrference
Definition 3.1. (a) MBC-identifies/ (written f~ BCM)) iff M, when fed the graph n,f f (in a"ny order), outputs over time an infinite sequence of computer programs all but finitely many of which compute 1.
Barzdin [3] acting on an important observation of Feldman [19] independently defined a notion, referred to as GN" in the Russian literature, which is the same as our BC.
John Steel [private communicaticJn, 19751 first pointed out to us that it is easy to verify that EX* c: BC: if 121 witnesses that %: EX*, IM' will witness that .YE BC, where W on f outputs the conjectures of 1M on f each patched to be correct (even if they are already correct) on what has been seen off SO far.
The proof of Theorem 3. I below was obtained in collaboration with Leo Harrington [privak communication, 19773 , and modifications of some of the crucial combinatorial steps supplied by Harrington to complete this proof have been exploited by us in some of our other proofs. Although Theorem 3.1 is a corollary of Theorem 3.4 below, we include a proof of it as a simpler introduction to the techniques we employ in much that follows.
Theorem 3.1 shows that the ostcnslble Newton;an conception of inductive inference, roughly EX"-identification, is not most general-"roughly EX"-identification" because Newton apparentl! th0ugb.t that explanations were not @nly final but also unique. It also yields a tradeoff between pto;ranr size [9] and ptlwer of inductive inference: if we allow ourselves ta accumulate larger and larger size explanations for each phenomenon, then we r:an, in general, machine identify larger classes of phenomena.
Barzdin Rug(irr stczgc s. Simultaneously execute the followiijg three substages tcrd 1 if ever) either suitahlc s and u arc' found in substage (i) or a mind change is found in substage (ii). Substages (ii) and (xii) ;lre monitored to ensure the proper coordination of the search for 7 and the growth of <& +l).
(ij Dovetail a search for x and CT such that c#&), t O, rang& --&&z {p(O), p( 1 I), x E domrin (u -4ico, ), and program q' converges on x to a value Z: a(~').
( Proof, Clearly .Y% BC. Let M be an IIM. It remains to shclw that M fails to OEX*-identify some f~ 9, By implicit use cf Lemma 3.2 we Dbtain a repetition free r.e. sequence of programs e, p(W), qW,O), p(O-I), qW, I), ~(1, W,. . .such that at least one of these programs computes such an f.
We proceed to give an iinformal effective construction in successive stages s 2 0 of the partial recursive functions computed by these programs. For programs j in our r.e. sequence, 4; denotes the finite initial segment of 4j defined before stage s and 47 = 0. q(s, i) is just a program for c&, i) which differs from p(s, i). Let
We let ii,. [23] Qj is initialized to contain from front to rear the elements of Di; in increasing order. Successively execute :he steps t 2 0 below.
Step t. Let ri be the program currently at the front of queue Qi. Search for s and G such that d that stage, ( Cs+l -C") it 0. Hence, 1M on f outputs infinitely many distinct programs.
Therefore, f E (9'-OEX*(M)). Cl
In Definition 2.17 we introduced the notion of NV"-xtrapolation due to Podnieks [3Q] . Podnieks has shown the following simple but pleasant characterization. Proof. The theorem follows from a simple modification of the proof of Theorem 2.13: in stage ,q of the construction in that proof search for s + 1 distinct X'S instead of one .x. ?
.A Non-1Jnion Theorem for BC"-idcntitication folio\; \ from the previous proof. In the proofs of Theorems 2.3 and 2.6 the only kind of anomalies we could use in our programs CJ wcrc points of dit'urg0zc~~ However, in our proof of Theorem 3.7 it turns out we are able to exploit anomalous points of conoergence. In fact, Bob Daley [17] has recently shown that this result can rrot be proved by exploiting anomalous points of divergence! He also generalizes the non-union theorem fol BC". Programs with anomalous points of convergence no satisfy Popper's refutability principle. Hence, in general one cannot find the howtdecf size set of refutable anomalies in one explanatory program before the next program is output. This is a complexity result about the relative speeds of processes. It follows that, in this ' case, while Popper's refutability principle is applicable, it is not useful since the refutable anomalies cannot: be found fast enough to be patched! Proof of Theorem 3.7. Clearly Y',l E BC'? We complete the proof for the n = 0 case only. Let 1M be any IIM. We suppose without loss of generality that (Vu)[M(a) is defined]. It remains to show that A4 fails to BC-identify some f~ YCJ. By implicit use of Lemma 3.2 we obtain a repetition free r.e. sequence of programs y(oJ,pU), p(2), ' -' such that one of these programs computes such an f. We proceed to give an informal effective construction of the +,,i)'s in successive stages s 20. Hence, although ther; are completely general purpose IIM's with respect to BC*-identification, BC* is not a practical identificatior( criterion; BC* is a sort ot asymptotic limit to potentially practical criteria, but there are no general purpose rnacLcd with respect to these latter criteria.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. IIM A& is described as follows. _IMH on input f$ n outputs a corresponding program efkn. efy, on any input x searches for the least p G n ( 
